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IIANS W. BLOM
By way of introduction to this volume on bicameralism it may be ap-
propriate lo delineate Ihe ficid Linde>’ discussion. And altbough at first sight
Ibis seems tobe a straigbtforward assignment, it muy prove la the end thaI
a simple and adequate definition of dic problems at band is not available.
Firsí of ah. hicameralism is a eoncept with a highly divergent sert of histo-
rical references. lo particular, Ihe ‘secoad’ of dic two chambers jo a bica-
meral parliamentary sysíem eludes uniform charaelerisation. Moreover,
the representative aspect of’second chambers’ is widcly placed in doubt,
and teods lo he regarded as un anaebronistie element in parliameotary Ii-
fe. r Une or several of these deseríptive and evaluative ambivalences are fluí
forward Lo prornote the case of abolition of’seeond ehambers’ and thereby
lo oblilerate bicameralism as parliamentary practice. Recent abolition in
Denmark and Sweden sbould show the secular trend.
Nevertheless. bicameralism is very mueh alive, evento Ihe poiot of beiog
discussed usa possible contribution lo the síreogíhening of parliamentarism
in the Luropean Community. The papers colleeted in tbk volume, taken lo-
geiher, underseore no doubt dic greal variation of histories, thcoríes and pro-
Núms. Din also, dic contrihutions suggest a ehanging and possibly worth-
whi)e approach lo pariiamentary insdíutions as sueh. la a way, this side-effect
can be regarded as a consequence of te somewhat uneommon perspective
on representalion, j.c. thai of dxc less representalive ‘secoad chambers’. Com-
menting on border-line cases of representation muy fol be dic typical ap-
Eg. (3. Leibholz. Dic Reprásentation la dcc Demokratie. (Berlin/New York 1973) 155,
opines thaI hist aiígemein aI1m~hJich dic Oberhduser polilisch stcrilc Instilutionen und ja
den meisten júngeren curopáisehen Verfassungen vóllig verschwunden Isitad].’; cf. JAR.
Marriott, Second chambers. An inducrivestudy la politicalscienee. (Frceport (NY) 19692 LOx-
lord 1910]> cg. 2371: a ¡acre realistie view is expressed ita J. Mustias and J. Grangé, Les se-
condes ehambres dii parlemení en Europe Occiden tale. Paris 1987.
JJ±viariay Ca,nunicacñn Social, 1. Servicio 0c Publicaciones Iloiversidad Compluícosc. Madrid. 996
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preach te Ihe subject-rnatter, but illustrative it nevertheless si By inveking
cíher aspects of representatien andby rev¡víng ebseleteenes. uncritical con-
ceptiens can be cerrected alid nenhisterícal enes enriched.
In Ibis intreduetien. 1 will deal with dic follewing tepies. Firsl, an at-
tempt will be presented te define bieameralism as we liud it today. Then
will fellow a short evervíew el t.he historleal origins in the differúnt Euro-
pean realms. Lastiy, sorne (>1 thc reasens ter making bicamera¡isrn mí lote-
resti ng tepic fer Ii sterwal and theeret leal investícallen wi II be aol orn brated.
BICAMERALISM: ‘IliE ACTUAL INSTITUTION
Cenfining eneselí te Europe. une finús ten ceuntries that have a bica-
meral system ja ene way er líe other. Twe enuntries abelished it reeently,
hringing the total of unicameral systems Ip Europe to <Nc. le this sense. bi-
eameralism is still dic maje treud. Hewever, líe diflerenees are not te he
everseen. ‘[bree eut citen are iederalist states. le which dic ‘seceed cham-
her’ takes the. forní el a federal ceuncil (Germany. Austria. Switzerland).
‘¡líe ether seven líave ene national parliament with twe chaníbers. ‘[bis dis-
tinclien is ene belween federal aud unitarv hicamcralisrn. ¡lis an imperlant
ene, ami may suggcst a re¡evant dimensien lcr future develpments of bica-
meralisní. Wc wil¡ discuss dic pessib¡e explanatiens br diese twe patterns
¡ ater en. Lel os firsI ta ke a clese r leek at the variatíens that can be len nd.
le dei ng se. it may be mesí apprepríate te cencentrate en the di iferen t pe—
sitices el líe ‘seceod chambers’.3 It is there thai we rnay lecate the majerdistinctions. In OM níedern cenceptíen el parl¡arnentary deníecracy. the ge-
neral nerm is preportienal representatien el thecitizeas la an assembly that
perlernís thc central rele in the legislative precess. Whatever dic natíenal
vanatiens en Uds general acer —whether thc le~islativc funetien pertains
exclusively te thc ‘first chamber’ criste be shared with etlíer bedies, whel-
líer eleetices are by district eren a natienal sca>e, whalever tbe specific ad-
ditienal cempetence in líe pelitical precess—- in medern parliamcntary dc-
moeracies the chucas are represented by a ‘lirsí clíamber’ eleeted hv
universal sufírage. ‘[he rest sote say is embellishment, ad iíbínirn expression
el natienal identity, ji ene Iikes, er incenvenient remnants el the past. llene
prelers. Te distinguish bicameral systems frení each cíher then scems te re-
quire only dic elassification of their ‘secead chambers’.
-. [bis mcchaoism recuis in contcnxporary practico as wclI.Vhe tasi ycars hayo witoessod
a growiog se 1-awareo ess ameng Dnlch Sena! ors, sorno of whom re bol 11w oharge of la ji ng
short jo democratie legitimaev. uy poíol¡og 001 thai Ihoir coítntorparts jo iho olbor ehaniber
la)] short in represen Lative quality.
Wobor,’ La a iso clu hica md y al sine-, o: Re enc da Do ir ¡‘nPhe el de ¡ir Seleuco ¡‘o fil ¡que
en France <0 á ¡ Erranger, 88(1972) 573-601,: 575. Le tui can,dra 1 ismo os! ra remení ceosiddré
cornmo un sysléoue en soi, it exprime soaplemení lexisteoce it une deuxiénio. ohambro.
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‘Seeond cbambers’
Until new, 1 havc heen speaking el’seccnd chambers’, as mest succinctly
expressing this additienal character cf the ‘scecnd’ el líe twe chambers.
l-Iistoricahly speaking, ibis is insume cases an anaebrenisní. Inactual prac-
tice, It is alse incerrect as a general term. In líe Netherlands, líe ‘secend
chamber’ is cflicially called thc Eerste Kamer der Staten-Generaal, líe First
(?hamber el the States-Generai. ‘[bis expresses seme sense cf histerical
centinuity en the part el the designas cf tlíe Dutch censtitutien cf 1815~
dic Secend Chamba was a nauvecaté, sínce propertional representatíon
was then intreduced lcr dic first time. Op líe ether hand, in ceuntries like
France er Austria, where IP iheir framing a mcdcrn censtitutien the
discussien was abeul whetherer nct adepti¡íg bicaníeralisní, reicrence was
made te a ‘sccend chamber’. Since ene cf tlíe majer argumenis in faveur
cf a ‘seccndclíamber’ was in terms cf líe neccssity te líave a representatien
efthe valenrior par~, dic ciassical (repubilcan) temí cf Senatus was (and is)
widely used. Alse in Dutch practice, thc mcmbers cf the First Chamber are
iniermally referred te as senaters. Altheugb as a matier cf fact. IP mest
ceuntries seme allusien te termine¡egy frem líe anclen régirne-peried is
made. cnly in the case cf the British Heuse el Lerús real centinuity is
prescnt. Lcr ah practical purpeses, tlíen. wc wilI centinue te use the neutral
íerm ‘seccnd cliamber’, frem new en skipping the iríverted cemmas.
Recruihncnt
In mest modern demecracies, secend chambers can be characterised by
staiing thai dic appeintment of Iheir members prcceeds in ways that are
less iuhly demccraíic than is líe case fer the correspcnding first chamber.
Ibis limitatien can take different fcrms. Members cf a secend ehamber may
eblain tbeir seat even witlícut being elected, like iii Píe United Kingdom,
cm may be partly elected. partly appeinted.
‘[here may exist restrictiens in eligihility like age restrictiens, er sedal
and econoníic restrictions may be imposed, professional qualifieations may
be required. Mereever, the ‘electerate’ may be limited: it may censisí cf a
specific greup cf represcntatives. cf a previncial er even cf a natienal ge-
vemnment. ‘¡‘he principie cf prepertienal representatien may be curtailed,
by giving mere er Iess equal weight te the previnces cía ceuntry.
Ah tbese limitaticns cf the demecratic principie as applying te the ceun-
terparí first chamber, are exemplified in bicameral practice in abcut as gre-
at a variety as the amcunt cf existing bicameral systems seems te permit.
SeeTable 1.
In the Netlíerlands, and lev líe greater pan cl its meníbers iii Belgium
and Italy, ene finds representatien cf the secend chamba appreaching pre-
pcrtienality, altheuglí differently frení thaI of líe first chamber. On Ihe ct-
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her hand cf the scale, the Heuse cf Lcrds defies any netien cf representa-
don cf an electorate. In this case, the representatives represení themsel-
ves, but as we will argue belcw, the person they represent is a pelitical ro-
le rather tban just an individual.
Intermediate systems like thai cf ihe German Federal Republic bave
olber ways lo express the pelitical character of iheir representatives, by lía-
ving them appciníed by ihe federal siates.
These wide variaticns are complemented by comparable divergences in
cempetencies cf the seccnd chambers.
Conipetence
Without gcing into much detail, a glance at Table 2 will suffice te give
grcuiíd te the observation that the formal power and competence of second
chambers escapes general definition.
In several cases, cg. the second chamber is provided with a coneiliation
procedure te arbitrate existing disputes with Ihe first chamber In matters
of legislature. Buí this is no regular practice. Vete powers can have a sus-
pending effect only, in seme cases existing in thecry only buí nct in practi-
ce. Mereover, second cbambcrs have widely differing competence as faras
legislation is coneerned. ‘[he reader is referred te Table 2 for more details.
In the same vein, differenccs can be enumerated concerning tbe possi-
bilities cf controling the executive, ihe duration cf mandate, the intervals
between renewal cf members. ‘[be aboye enumeration may suffice, howe-
ver, íc indicate the great variety cf ways in whiclí second chambers devia-
te from the contemporary norm cf democratie representation and the va-
ricus consequences tuis deviation has lcd lo in constitutional arrangements.
But líow did ah this come aboui?
HISTORICAL DIMENSIONS
The historical investigation cf the emergence and development cf po-
hitical instituticns is highly apt te lead te results that shed liglíl cn what bi-
cameralism is ah about. In opposition te a teclínical-juridical approach, in
particular, histerical researelí is prone to elucidate thc more comprehensi-
ve contexí thai produced and sustained ibis systematically inconvenient as-
pecí cf mcdcrn parliamentarism. In the contributions lo Ibis volume, ene
wihI find very insiglítiul analyses of bicameral aspects of parliamentarism
in lis original feudal stage, as well as of its prospering and suffering under
the influence of Dic exigencies of dic emergence of líe modern siate. Re-
flecting Ihe balance of power in lís political, ecoríomic, social and cultural
dimcnsions, as it evolved between nebiliiy, crown, ehurch and cities, bet-
Ilanie W. Bic,,,a
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ween centre and periphery. between ene fcrm of rcprcsentaiion and anot-
her, dic history of parliamentarism shows a nomber of peculiarities Me-
vant te thc hisiory of bicameralism proper. See Table 3.
The early appcarance of a bicameral system in (ircat Britain, ami its
virtual absence iii ethermajor ceuntries inEurepe, has eliclied many a cern-
mení frcm histcrians of parliamentarism. Rudolfine von Ocr and Wim
Blockmans, ¡nfra, presení ibe argumenis cf Otto Hinize in Uds respecí, te-
gethcr with iheir appraisal in dic ligbt of recení research. Hintze’s argo-
níení ceniered en the feudalism of the Carelingian beartland as Píe feun-
tain cl tbe Dreikuriensysrern, (he absence of which in ilie Randiander
permitía! Píe develcpment cf bicameral fornís cf representation diere.
Hinize’s insisiance en dic feudal crigins of tnooiern represeniation links in
with sorne of dic characteristie elemenis cf Gierke’s tenassenschuftsrecht.
Both were very much cencerned te understand Píe pelitical world cf their
own day, which also saw appear ihe principled buí almosí despairing analy-
sis cf Carl Schmitíi In a way. ibeir cencern was noi se much te give an ex-
planatien el bicameraiism as such, bat te develop a riotion of representa-
tion independení frení ihe dominaní. mcdern liberal-dernocratie one.>lt 15
a biased garne of typology construction oot of which dic typus bicamera-
lisrn is suggested te arise.
Kcenigsherger has emphasised dic inherently dynaníie character cfsys-
tenis of representatien. According te ihis vicw, ihe develepment of parlia-
mentarisní has nothing te dc witb welrgeschichfliche precesses, buí sheuld
be analysed accerditíg te a power-pclitica! sclíeníe. He notices that dic con-
clusive esiablishmeni cf parliamenlarism in Grení Britain during ibe se-
venteeuíth ccníury contairís many a iucky’ momení in betlí natienal and in-
ternational circumstances.6No deubí, ihe quite streng positien of ihe Ccmmens, partly tlowing <rení
ils containing bcth geniry and citizens, represenhing líe borcughs in Píe
prccesses cl decisicn-making in a fairly integrated political sysiem, in cern-
bination wiíh ibe way nobility aní church sbaped líe Heuse of Lorís, are
important eleníenis te explain ibis early and remarkable example cl bica-
Hintze, Feudalismos - Kapiíelismus. lId. 6. Oestreich. (3óttingen 1970; 0. von (iierke.
Das deutsche Cenu.vsen.ve:haftvrechs. 4 veIs. Graz1954 (reprs. oíl 868-191 3-ed.); (7. Sehníitt.
F/at crisis nf parliernentory democracy. Tu-. el Dic gésresgeschichtf¿clic I.age des heutígen Pat-
/ennenlarismas (Berlin 3923> lay E. Kennedy. Canibridge (Mass) 1985.
-‘ l-{intze mdchtc den Staatstypus. dom das Dreikuriensystern eritspricht, nís einen fort-
geschrivtenen. intensiveren Staatsbclrieb bezeichaneuí im Vergleich su der mehr extensiven
rUckstándigeuí Helriebsweisc des Olteren Typus. dom das alte Zweikamníersystem onts-
pricht. 64-5. Hintze reIles on nolions Iike 1-ierrscher als Reprkisentant ciner Gesanítheit.
¡caler Selhstrcgierung’ aurrd ‘Iminunitát’. ¿md stresses tilo role of Roman Iaw and Rile rae-
dernising iníluence of tilo continuing power struggle hetween silo states of tilo Buropean
nuainíand, p 74.
¡—1.6. Koen igsho’rger, Po/itíciwn.s uní] r.k-tunvi. Fssavs in cari> modere histe>t-y. (Len -
de,n/Roncevertc 1986) PI.
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Table 3. flistorical development ofsecoad chambas (adaptedfrom Mastias and Grangé, Les secondes
alumbres, 46-429;finalform ofsecoad chambas indicated Ay itahcs
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naeralisrn. In particular, a comparisen of dic Britisb case te thc evolution
of parliarnentarisní in the Castilian Kingdom suggests that the ‘constitu-
tienalisation of aristocracy’ is a decisive factor in the emergence of bica-
meralisní, maybe even of a strong parliamentary system itself (cf ihe con-
tribution of Croft and ‘[hcmpson, ¡nfra).
It is however, one t’ríing te enumerate tbe circunístances that led lo bi-
cameralisní in Great Britian, quite another to explain the institujon itself.
Mi attempt at periodisation
Wc have noted a tendcncy in Ihe literature te regard second chambers
as expcnent of the rcrnnants of a pre-democratic order, clcaked in the sa-
llew garb of traditional legitirnacy. One should, however, take care lest ene
takcs this as a characteristic of seccnd chaníbers throughout histcry. In the
first place, as we will indicate below, in the premodern period thc seccnd
clíamber represented the ‘nation’ as a whele, wlíereas the representatives
of the people represented ‘intcrests’, instead of tbe general interest. In t¡íe
secend place, spcaking in térms of wlíat private interests are represented
in ihe seccnd chamber, velís the really importaní charactcristics of bica-
meralisrn: the interdependence of its chambers. Hicameralism has not be-
en invented recently, but is about as oid as parlianíentarisní itself. Merco-
ver, Ihe case of the United States of America is presented —by Thomas
Frósehí, ¡nfra— lo indicate that a second chamber can be made an instru-
níent in a mcdern political system as weB.
In [bis volume abundant evidence is given te the effcct thaI repre-
sentation has tended te segregate itself mio different clíambers. More of-
ten iban nol, wc find bi —or tricameral representation, suggesting thai a
differentiation cf titíes te be represented is central te [he conccpt of re-
presentation itsclf. Aiming at a periodisation cf bicameralisní, we may
therefore be advised to loek te the wider context of representation itself.
On [he ether hand, ene may question the suggestion implicit in such an
approaclí that bicameralisní is just ene of Ihe ways in whieh representa-
tion becomes instituicnalised. ‘[he literature en stdnd¡sch Verfassung, mo-
re ofien Pían nol. secms te imply thaI bicaníeralisní is nol ‘thc real thing’.
But overcoming the estaíes-paradigm níay be net as easy as ene wculd Ii-
ke te.
What wc need is a theeretical argumcnt te order ah [hese differcnt di-
mensions, aspects and partial histories. It is evident that therc is nol ene
cxplanatcry argument abcut ihe history cf bicameralism, en at least the sa-
me grcunds as [here is not ene type of bicaníeralism, insorne cases not even
within ene country. Bicameralisní is an institution subject te change, res-
ponding te clíanging circumstances, pcssibly even emhcdying Píe vitahity
of [he parliamentary system in Western states. Historians no lenger swa-
180 1—1 ¡cus VV. 8/onu
110w Hintze’s sweeping gencralisations head and tau, nor dc they accept
doc histcricist implicaticus el (3ierke’s centrast between ergatíicist Genes-
sensckíaft ami mechanistic Kontra/<í. Qur rncderr netion of cg. Freíích par-
liamentarisno has beceme much nieve sephisticated fellewing mere detal-
Icé kncwledge cf tloe variegated histeries ef the prevircial parliamenís and
the central role cl French bureaucracv. -
‘[wo dcníinant unes cf argument may be contrasted. Qn the ene líand
wc have thosc whe argee that the systení el pa rílaDic ntarv represen tatien
is a refiectior of tloe actual pelitical [erces aiíd pOWC~[ rel a tu ens iii a u ation.
1 n tlíe age cf deníocratic revelut ion s’. [he beurgecisie lcught tlíei r way to
parliament, dcstrcying cutilved privileges el (he oíd rtiliuig classcs. ‘¡loe con-
tinuing existence el secend chambers in parliament rellecis Ihe fact that
the beurgecis uprise was enly partially suceessÍul. Sccond clíambcrs re-
present the unteuched fertresses Ilie anti-deníocratic [erces ir society ma-
naged te rescuc. ‘[he practical inoplicatiens cf tuis peirt cl view evidently
are 1 lía t bicameral isno is a redectien of [he past, anoi ¿izo i níped míen t fon a
genuine demecratic luture.
Qn doc cther end cf the seale, we see dic notien el parliamentary insti-
tutiens expressing the ioleclogical lerníaticns in a natien, and what is mere,
as a pessible avenue te defiííing thcsc ideclogical fernoations. ‘[he ccntinuing
existence of bicameralisní is taken as precí lcr líe hypctloesis that bicame-
ralisní is wloat accerds with the mere precise cenceptier cf parliamentary
represeíítatien. Accerding te this semcwhat cssentiaIistic cenception, ms-
ti ttatiers eiíobcdy (part of) tloe pci itical sel i—cencepticn el a natien)
These twe appreaches te bicaníeralism are beth reflected in the studies
in Ibis velume. Mest cften they are cembired iii descnibing inopertant epi-
sedes ir the histerical development el bicameral systems. E.specially in the
peried el ceíistitut¡enal codificatieíí areniod 1800, bedo pewer struggle auíd
debate en thc naticíoal identity aná [he institutiens apprepriate te it get
theirduei In develeping sonoe arguníents fer aperiedisation of líe histery
cf bicaaiíeralisní It wil 1 be fi [ti ng te Itocerperate hedí aspecis. Ihis weuld
imply ccnohining a functienalistic and a deterníinistic explanatery scheníe.
Accerding te the lirst. bicameral institutiorís perferní furctiens in realiuing
the pelitical gcals el a natien. like cnfercing a líenícgeneity cf heterege-
neous elements, suclí as estates. classes, greups cf dilierent levels cf pro-
fcssienals. Moreever, te these geals noay belong the realisatien cf certain
qualities cf the represcuotative aré legislative precess. In this respect ene
See i -a - J , IZ , Maj Dr, Aepresecu lo tive ge’ ver, un ecu tu; carie oír mc/crí; Freía ce. New 11:1 veo/Lelo —
deio 19811.
Tile rnest eoutstandíng reprcsentalive of tbk ¿ippro1ueta sOllo> (.iicrke. iuo bis I)as deimis—
che Genctsscnor-liajtsrcú-/ac, especial y lo tile part e*f ve rime III Ira losLite d and coliteol bv E.W.
M aití and as /‘olicie;a/ 1/acerico of clac Mide/fc A ge. (7:iroabridge 19(11>.
Fer a h gil y peleno e use of tilese ovo approaches. see (7 Seloioíití. hile eFisis. es WC II >5
1 cihbolz. Dic Rcpr¿isenwuion.
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may point te the opinion that a second chaníber functions as a pretective
belt areund thc monarclí against a possibly toe massive popular influerce
en legislatíen. er te its description as a ‘chambre dc réflexien’. as an cm-
bediment of considered opinen. ‘[bis lunctionalistic perspective tends te
develop into arguments about the desirabilitv of bicaníeral institutions, rot
recessarily implying their nccessity or inevitability. Societies may decide
not te have functicns perfermed that are salutary, er te have these perfor-
mcd in a different manner. Ivan Rocis, ¡nfra. elaberates this theme in his
discussior of the monocameral phase in English history during the Crem-
wcllian period. ‘[he funclienal perspectivc is also dcminart in much of the
Seandinavian abcliticnist history, as is evident freno the eontributions cf
Michael Metcalf and Nils Stjernquist. It lingers en the background of mest
cf dic centributions en the actual role cf the secord chamber in the wer-
king of the English parliament. ‘¡líe functionalist apprcach. in shert, con-
ccrtrates en the elfects of bicameralisno aré en iheir evaluation ir thc light
of thc professed gcals of the pelitical erder. It may poirt te alternative so-
lutions, te built-in incensistencies, cr te insufficient official definiticns cl
the situatien.
Quite different is Píe deterministie power-political apprcach. Systems
el representation are outceníes nol cf the ceerdinated pursuit of societal
geals, but of the balance cf pewer between different elaimants for the ulti-
mate rule cf the system. As longas abselute power ¡san impessibility, sys-
tems of balancing are inevitable. Bicameral systems, hence, are sign of a
lack cf supremacy on the part el any of the contestant greups. Bicamera-
lisní is cempremise. net principIe. Ir ‘eschatclogical’ histories (>1 parlia-
mentarisní. in particular, this line of approach gets its fulí ferce. Pregressi-
ve and reacticnary ferces centest the legislative pcwer. ‘[he demccratic
forces, oppesing any remnanis cf traditienal privileges, move towards the
ralisatien of democratic representation based on universal suifrage. mdc-
cd, tlíis is a way in which thc secular trené in moderr history may be pre-
sented. althcugh it is a matter cf histerical research te determine ir how
far, and whether at alí, It is accurate te describe the devclcpníent cf peliti-
cal systems frem the exclusive perspective of ene cf the participant groups.
Nevertheless. in a less unceníprcmising vein, power polities must be re-
garded as ar ineluctable element in the explanation of bicameralism. De-
mccratic referís have. mere efien iban not, been based en pewer-based
deníanús lrem hitherte unrepresented groups, although, again noere oftcn
than not, particularistie brees wcre jeined by those whe tried te refcrmu-
late tI-oc everalí enás cf ilie seciety in view cf newly arisen circunístances.
In a classieal idiení, aríiculatiens cf’vclentés particuliéres’ xvere accempa-
nied by er reintegrated into the articulation of a ‘volonté générale’. ‘[he
histery of bicameralism reflects this dual structurc.
Cengar reminds us of tlíe deuble meaning of representatien: in an un-
dividualisí sense loe speaks of représentat¡on-délégat¡orc, where the repre-
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sentatives are delegates cf the represented, in contrast te the organie re-
presentation as symbolisation: représentation-f¡guration.’ Neither of the-
se twc fcrms is suitable for alí cases of representation. ‘[he barons of the
realm seem deonied te the figurative form. Tbey have received no delega-
tion, nor do they cheose ir their midst enes te be delegated. Wlíatever they
do cIsc, they figurate representatien gua/date gua. Whcreas a king may be
elected, thcy are nol. But just likc kings can beceme tyrarts, noblemen can
forfeit their symbclic quality, notas a consequence of trespassing some de-
legation, but by relirquishing their idertification with the conímen interest
cf the ccmmunity they figurate. Symbelisaticr no dcubt means rhetcric
and metaphoric play of words. Kcenigsbcrger, therefore, suggests te con-
centrate en power.íí But, does delegation fare so mueh belter? Prcsumably
net. Delegation may be a differcrt instituienal arrangement cf represen-
tation (and ir its dealings with cther political forces a very effective ore),
it carnet function without at least sorne elements cf rhetoric and symbe-
lístion.
Bicameralism is that political arrargement ir which diese two patterns
of representation are segregated aré embedied ir separate chambers. ‘[loe
permanency of bicameral arrangernents depends en an interlaced distri-
bution of power and symbolism. Ii. e.g.. the ‘chamber cf delegates’ dees not
develop a sense of representirg ‘the’ ceuntry vis-a-vis countervailing po-
wers, it will scarcely evercome the inberert tendency tc particularisno aré
wiJI soen [cese any political weight it may have pessessed when instituted.
Bid, as success breeds sucecss, delegates would rever start te represent the
raticral intcrest if they did nel marage first te ceuntervail the deminant
pewers in their reglect of the ‘benum comníune’. lnstitutieralisatien is al-
ways a matter of werds and decds. It is, acceréing te Eberhard Scloníitt. ‘im-
mer als soziopelitisches Phánoníen, als «seziale Beziehurg» zu sehen’.
Admittedly, this is dic kird of functieralist analysis that Koenigsberger
frowns at.9But se is the theory cfNerbert Elias he eníploys himself. Ir par-ticular, the seeord rnechanism Keenigsberger presents follewing Elias, that
cf’the depersenalization and institutienalizatien cf tbe exercise of power’,
can cnly be understeed in ierms of social pesitien. social role, and role be-
havicur as is argued by Schmitt. Aré although Keenigsberger aré Scbmitt
agree ir respect of the necessity te see parliamentary irstitutions ir a dy-
namic pcrspeetive, Schmitt’s appreach te representatior as a pattcrn cf so-
Y. M-J. Couagar, Oried emnes tangit, ab omnibus tractari et approhaíi debel’, Revee
híshrique de dro&-hcc<xais-eí Ñrange-e 36 -( ¡-955)2 l.Q-259~ e;p.248—251Y
Koenigsberger. Politicians and virceosí, 4: Basically, therefore, tile ilistory of tilo reía-
tielos between monarchies alod parilaunenís is tilo story of a struggle for power”.
E. Scilmitt, Rcprdsecucalion lAtId Rcvotí¡tion. Fine L/n.tcrsuc/aung zar Genesis dcc konci-
cuccíta/c,u Tiucorie and Prailí par/arncntarisc/aer Reprúsencacion auN dcc Herrsí:Iiafispraxis cies
Acuciccí régime i,u Frankreich (1760-1789). (Munich 1969)43 f.
Koenigsberger, Po/iticiacus and vire-ansi, xi.
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cial relationships has sorne advantages over the power conflict inclinations
of ihe Elias-níedel.
In the first place, Schmitt’s medel can more easily acomnoedate the
distinctien of Congar bctween ‘représentatior-délégation’ aré ‘représen-
tation-figuration’. In thc seconé place, it permits thc understanding of thc
history of parliameníarism as a confrontation of different eoncepts of re-
presentation. lf my thesis about bicanoeralism as thc institutionalisation of
a bifurcateé coneeption of representation is correct, it may even be a very
plausible approach.
Corpus myst¡cuin, I¡berty, democracy
Ir an attempt at a periodisation of the history of bicameralism, 1 sug-
gesí te leok en the ene band te donoirant pelitical values, or the other te
the changirg balance of power. As a starting point, the implicit debate bet-
ween Montesquieu and Rousseau may be illunoinative. In Du contrat so-
cial, Rousseau produced the following metaplíer:
‘Les eharlatans du Japon dépéeent, diL-on, un cntant aux yeux des
spectateurs: puis, jetant en lair teus ses membres l’un aprés lautre. lis
fent retomber l’enfant vivant et tcut rassemblé. ‘[e-ls sont á peu prés
les tours de gobelets de nos politiques: aprés avoir démembré le corps
social par un prestige digre de la feire, lis rassemblent les piéces en nc
sait commentti*
Rousseau’s scorn of political prctenéers aré illusionists who seek te
unite tbc bcdy politic by separation of powcrs leaves no éoubt about his
target. Against Montesquieu he is certain that thcrc is no other way te re-
alise [he democratie ideal bid by majority. Ilie liberal ideal of [he rule of
law tbat was so central te his opponent was te Rousseau but a conceited
forno of slavery. ‘[he conception of liberty as the prime gocé of society was,
however, no less a modern netion than thai of éemoeracy. Ir important res-
peets it ever has older erigins, comparable te those of bicameralisno. As lar
as bicameralisno is concerned, liberty ané éenoocracy tené te cenflict. ‘[he
liberal anil-autocratie, antidespotie, ané anti-arbitrary principie is te re-
place personalizeé sovereignty by systcmic sovcrcignty. ‘[he legislative pro-
cess noay be formally coneluded by dic monarch, its principie should be ba-
lanceé éccisior-noaking starting freno thc popular articulation of demanés.
Ir Montcsquieu’s conception both cbambers perforo [heir specific fune-
tions ir formulatirg [he general will. Followirg a long traditior of republí-
can thought, aré foreshaéowing crities of Robespierre’s arbitrary rule likc
Benjanoin Constant, Montesquieu rested convinceé that tLíc democratie
Bock II, chap. ua,
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principie abre is nc guarantee fer (he rule cf law. Ir representatien itself
an antiécte shculd be feuné agairst lis pcssible perversien. Rut rule cf law
without democracy is a fermalisní. because it fails an answer te tloe ques-
tien: ‘Whcse law is it anyway’.?’
Pre-moécrn ncticrs cf representador are of a níere hclistic nature. As
(he king represents his people, aré thc ncbility represent theirs, develeped
the rotien of privilegeé greups represcntirg ihemselves. It createé a certain
tensior betweer heneur aré liberties, bctween a níeral qtaalifieatien te spe-
ak fer ethcrs and a qualificatien feunded in law. 1-Sicaníeralisní níay be regar-
ded asan institutuieral selutier cf this tersien. Wc peinteé eut that in Mon-
tesquieu liberty takes advantage of heneur. Bicameralisní is identificé with
this value. Buí it dié ret helé long against ihe new ultiníate value cf deme-
cracy, seceré chambers beeeming seconé te the flrst cloamber. An interesting
fact abeul the nireteerth ceniury, however, is dial nor the argunícnt <rení he-
neur nor thai ferm liberty éid yielé easily ané cenípleícly. ‘[he arguríenís put
forward ir France, ltaly, II-oc Netherlarúsor clscwlíere alt exhiblí ibis semewhat
elusive mixture of honcur as a moral qualificatior te represent ané the libe-
ral rule of law te be guarantecé by balanceé representador. ‘[he noixture was
elusive sinee neither of these twe rivals te éemocracy were any lenger exclu-
sively political. 1-leneur had beceme a Iifestyle. ané the rule cf law was taker
care cf by a professioral bureaucraey and judiciary. Nevertheless ir unarv
ceuntries as we líave seen. bicarneralisní certinued te exist. partly as a con-
sequenee of tI-oc inertia cf institutiejíal arrargernení, partly because ‘hencur’
aré ‘liberty’ were adapteé te tlíe chargi¡íg predicamení of éenoccracy.
Federal hkamcralism
One may wender, whether federal ferms of bicameralism cerforno te this
seheme. At first sight, federal bicameralisno seenís te rcflect quite elber ten-
síers, viz. that betwcer centralisatien and regional independerce. Buí il WC
survcy the wcrkings of these tensicrs in Ihe earlypericé of parliameniarisuíí,
heneur aré liberties are again central te federal-like fornís of bicameralisur.
‘[he preservatien of regieral liberties, ihe defence of regional mirerities
agairsí an abstract majeriíy. mereever, is rot restricted lo federal bicame-
ralism. It has been reicé as a tepic cf interest ir cg. ti-oc Heuse cf Lerés as
well. Qn the other hané, meécrn federal bieameralism is markedly éistirct
frení unitary bicameralisní. As 3. Pele explairs, ¡nfra, the federal solutien is
provideé with additicral arguments. Inéccé. bicamcralism secms te be in-
herert te fcéeralism. As a rccent survcy claims that almost alí federal states
ir the world have bicanoeral legislatures (16 cut of 17), whcreasthe níajcrity
of unitary siales lives by noene-cameral systenís.is Buí tbe forní bicameralism
¡ L. D - Len g ley 11 lo d W -J . Ql esz.ek. E icamera/fi cilicio ~. C <ni/evene e e onu ni lccee./s íd Crin —
grcss (New Haven/Lendon 1989) 15.
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takes in federal siates, again, is variegated. In federal states cf the presiden-
tial typc, like thc Uniteé Statcs, Píe legislative impact of seceré chambers is
far mere importan than ir parliamentary systems like the Luropear enes.
llspeeially in ihe centext of ihe Europcan Community ihese twe éilferent
medels make us aware of very cemplicateé way in which represertation aré
form cfgovernmert interací. ‘[loe ‘democratic deficit’ cf Europe en the ene
haré, aré ihe recé lcr efficient unificatien en ilie other, force us te recen-
sider the varleus arguments for beth appreaches te feéeralism anew. ‘[he re-
ader is referreé te thc minutes of the symposiuno, ¿nfra, for mere éetails.
Efficieney
Qur moéerr éeníand en polities is more ané more ir terms of efficiency.
Nct seléem is the question poseé, whether secoré chaníbers ‘deliver the ge-
eds’. whether they produce the eutccmes they are supposed te bring fcrward
ir an efficient way (er produce ihese at ah). Verrer Bogéarer. ¿nfra, suc-
cinctly sumníarizes tI-íe possible benefits seconé ehambers níight be sajé te
have, aré sumníarises thc possible functicral equivalents te bicamerahism.
¡lis argument seems te peiní cuí that seceré chanobers are less than effieient.
Ir a very remarkeable aralysis of bicarneralism. Brernar aré Hamlin, have
peinted eut that ihere vcry well may be an efficicnt role fer secené chaní-
bers. tJsing thíc apparatus of publiecheice Iheery, they éemensíratc thai bi-
caníeralism noav enhance the stability cf ihe decisien-rnakingprocess irme-
dcrr éemecraey. ‘[bey shew thai, withir the limits el certain restricticns.
bicaníeralism is ar institutieral device te rnakc parlianíentary decisien-uioa-
king mere resporsive te dic urderlying preferences of the ciiizenry. Ir ciher
werds, en their view, seconé honses are ííct an anemaly in the eertext of me-
écrr éeníocratic theery, but en ihe centrarv a contribution te its efficiercv.
TOPICS FOR RESEARCII
Over the last twe years. Duiclí political ¡ile has wilnesseé a grewirg in-
teresí ir the fcurdaíions aré funcíioning of the sccond chaníber ir parlia-
mentary decisior-making. ‘[he oíd cpitheter of’chambre de réflexior’ be-
cernes mere aríd more justan expressioaí lcr ihe expectation thai a secené
chamber can enharce the qualiíy cf éeeisier-making. Mere aré mere, tUs
is scruíinizcd fer its possibly éestabilizing effects, fer its eflieierey. without
Ci - B re nn alo anel A. Ham Ii n, Bicaníera/tvnu acíd stabi/icv. Un iversity of Sontila mpton
Di seussi rilo Papers iuo Ecenomi es a rd Ecoremetnos Gt)t12 U o iversity of Soutilaaoopton 1<19>).
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however leadirg te an upsurge of abolitienisí terdercies. Next te thai, it is
becemingircreasingly lirked with thc preblem of parliamentary life ir Eu-
rope. 1< we may regaré these debates as a significarí indicatien, bicamera-
lisní is alí but dead, aré seems te irvitate sustaireé sehclarly aitertier.
‘[opies fer research te be sumnoariscé here, can be divideé irte two ca-
tegories. First, we líave these topies researcheé ir this velume. aré seconé.
diere are ihese that suggcst themselvcs after styéyirg the papers preser-
ted líere. Notwithstanéirg the mary cemparative aré theeretically críen-
icé stuéies te be feuné ir tlíc present velunoe, it seenos correct te remark
thai Iheir noam ihrust is te enrieh cur loisterical piciure of ihe practical lurc-
tienirg cf bicaníeralisní, cften en a lcw level of gererality. (luyen the scar-
city of stuéies of ihis kiré. especially encempassirg medieval and early-
mederr as well as meéern examples cf bicanícralisní, Ibis volume is a
welceme contributier te the kind of researclí calleé for ir ihe first place.
Qur kuícwledge of bicanoeralism weuld, se it seems. be greatly enharceé. if
more ef/crí were deveted te updati;og the theoretical siructures applied te
the phcreníenon. Sirce tloe days of Hinize, Kceííigsberger is ene of the lew
te líave undertaken the adventure cf a crispy aré irsightful picture ir ternos
cf his Í/ominium po/i/icurn et regale. Fhe possibil It¡es. hcwever, are far <rení
exhausteé. and what is mere. the problenís that face parlianíentarism te-
day, luí particular iii relation le grewing international inI egratien, are noe—
re pressing than ever. It is te be hopeé that this volunie triggers ihis irle-
grative kiné el research, with as rouch success as thc erganisation el ilie
1990-Cerfcrence did trigger this bock.
